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ARGUMENT

I.

THE PRATTS CAN RELY ON ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT NOT
CHALLENGED BY MR. MARKS' AFFIDAVIT.
The argument of Mary Ann Nichols 1 and her attorneys (hereafter Defendants), that

the Pratts cannot rely on the allegations of their pleading to support their Statement of
Facts, is without merit. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) (stating when a motion for summary
judgment is supported by affidavit, an adverse party must produce evidence to show a
dispute of fact) applies only to affidavits that controvert a pleading. A party opposing
summary judgment can rely on the allegations of his pleading where those allegations are
not controverted by matters outside the pleadings. Wilkinson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 975
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998). The rule is plainly stated in Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App.
8 6 ^ 2 4 , 67 P.3d 1042: 2
[A]n affidavit supporting a summary judgment motion, proffering evidence
in contradiction of only some of the opposing party's allegations, does not
trigger a requirement that the opposing party proffer evidence supporting
those allegations that remain unchallenged.
The Pratts are entitled to rely on Walter v. Stewart, and rely on the allegations of
their pleadings as to matters not controverted by matters outside the pleadings.

1

Mary Ann's maiden surname was apparently Kingston. Mary Ann is married; the
Pratts have learned her married surname is Nichols.
2

This is a point on which the Court could do a service to the public, bar, and trial
courts, and perhaps avoid future litigation and waste of judicial resources. It is common for
a Rule 12( b)(6) motion to raise several issues, only one of which is affected by matters
presented outside the pleadings. The Court may wish to consider clarifying whether the
effect is merely as stated in Walter v. Stewart supra, or whether a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
supported by matters outside the pleadings actually is converted to a Rule 56 motion only
as to issues affected by those extraneous matters, and remains a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to
issues not affected by matters outside the pleadings.
1

Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debrv, 2001 UT App. 397, 38 P.3d 984, does not
support Defendants' argument. Campbell stated that "once the proponent of summary
judgment establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opponent to provide some
evidence in opposition to the motion," Id. at ^f 18. "A prima facie case has been made
when evidence has been received ••• that, in the absence of contrary evidence, would
entitle the party having the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at/h 6
(citation omitted). In other words, Campbell says a party opposing summary judgment has
no burden to provide evidence on an issue until the moving party establishes a prima facie
case as to that issue. That is the same rule stated in Walter, supra. In this action, the only
matter outside the pleadings was an Affidavit of William Mark, describing the defendants'
press conference. Mr. Mark's affidavit did not challenge the allegations of the Pratts'
pleading upon which they rely to support their Statement of Facts. Under Campbell, Mr.
Mack's affidavit did not establish a prima facie case shifting the burden to the Pratts to
produce evidence to support their Statement of Facts. Therefore, the Pratts can rely on
the unchallenged allegations of their pleading.

II.

THE JUDICIAL PUBLICATION PRIVILEGE ISSUE IS PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT.
Under Utah R. App. Proc. 46, certiorari is a matter of judicial discretion, to be

granted for "special and important reasons." This matter is before the Supreme Court
pursuant to its Order granting the Pratts' Petition for Certiorari, in which this Court has
already ordered it would hear the issues described in its Order. Implicit in the Court's
Order granting certiorari was its finding, after being informed by the parties' briefs in
support of and in opposition to certiorari, that the requirements of Rule 46 were satisfied.
Defendants' "preservation of issues" argument is a thinly disguised collateral attack on the
Court's Order granting certiorari, and should be disregarded for that reason.
2

Defendants are also wrong on the merits. The only "error" committed by the Pratts
was the late filing of their Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Based on Judicial Privilege. That Memorandum was before the trial court six full
days before Defendants submitted their Motion to Dismiss for decision.

3

The Pratts also

filed a Motion to Strike Defendants' "Judicial Privilege" Argument, a motion that
Defendants did not oppose, a full month before the trial court made its decision. It is quite
common for trial courts to accept late-filed memoranda. It is a reasonable inference,
which this Court accepts as true for purposes of appeal, that the trial court would not have
stricken the Pratts' Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Based on Judicial Privilege, except for Defendants' having filed a Motion to Strike the
Pratts' Reply Memorandum, a motion that the Pratts opposed and that Defendants never
submitted for decision. All of those motions and memoranda were before the trial court
before it ruled on any motion. The trial court not only knew of the asserted error, the
Pratts specifically raised the issue, asked the trial court to reach what the Pratts contend
is the right result on the merits, and presented to the trial court the legal authority to do
so. The trial court had before it all the information including controlling legal authority
necessary for it to avoid the error, the opportunity to avoid it, and the Pratts' request that
the court avoid it. Based on the above, the Pratts preserved the issue for appeal.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE "INVITED ERROR" RULE.
In point 1(C) of their Brief of Appellants, the Pratt discussed the case law behind

the "invited error" doctrine. Attached hereto as Addendum A is a table surveying most
Utah appellate decisions applying the "invited error" doctrine. The vast majority of cases

3

Utah R. Civ. Proc. 7(d) provides, "When briefing is complete, either party may file
a 'Request to Submit for Decision.' ... If no party files a request, the motion will not be
submitted for decision."
3

involve counsel's conscious decisions during the heat and rush of trial, that affirmatively
led the trial court to commit otherwise reversible errors in impaneling and instructing
juries and in admitting or excluding evidence. It should be the rare case indeed where the
"invited error" doctrine is applied in situations where the trial court has weeks rather than
minutes to consider before deciding a matter, particularly where the error results from the
filing of a memorandum that, while late, is filed a week before a motion is submitted for
decision and a full month before the trial court makes its decision. This is not such a case.
For these and the additional reasons stated in Point II above, the Pratts did not invite the
trial court to commit error.
Even Defendants "agree that a court should not apply the [invited error] doctrine
where it is not raised by either party ..." [Brief of Appellees p. 15] Defendants argue
they did raise the issue. However, their Brief of Appellees to the Court of Appeals shows
"it just ain't so." Defendants only argued that the Pratts waived the "judicial proceeding
privilege" issue by failing to preserve it for appeal. Failing to preserve an issue, which
is all that Defendants argued, is a different legal principle than invited error.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISMISSAL BASED ON THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
PRIVILEGE.
Defendants simply ignore Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1311/w.7 (Utah 1990),

which states that "The class of occasions where the publication of defamatory matter is
absolutely privileged is confined within narrow limits to cases in which the public service
or the administration of justice requires complete immunity to account for language used."
Allen relied on DeBryv. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, 992 P.2d 979 and Brehanyv. Nordstrom,
812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991).
Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28 1 15, 20 P.3d 895 recognizes an "excessive
publication" limit on the "judicial proceeding" privilege. Defendants place too much
4

reliance on the word "may" in the Krouse statement that "the judicial proceeding privilege
may be lost due to excessive publication." Defendants want the "excessive publication"
rule to be, "the judicial proceeding privilege may be, or maybe it won't be, lost due to
excessive publication." That is no rule at all, it is meaningless gobbledygook. Defendants
quote but want this Court to ignore the its own more absolute statement:
Statements that are otherwise privileged lose their privilege if they are
excessively published, that is, "published to more persons than the scope of
the privilege requires to effectuate its purpose." ... The excessive
publication rule, in the context of judicial proceeding privilege cases, is to
prevent abuse of the privilege by publication of defamatory statements to
persons who have no connection to the judicial proceeding. Therefore, ...
the [publication] would be excessively published if it was published to more
persons than necessary to resolve the dispute or further the objectives of the
proposed litigation, in other words, if the letter was published to those who
did not have a legitimate role in resolving the dispute, or if it was published
to persons who did not have an adequate legal interest in the outcome of the
proposed litigation.
Id. Defendants' reliance on the Krouse Court's paraphrase of Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812
P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) is even less tenable, as Brehany actually stated, "The plaintiff can
show abuse of the privilege by proving ... that the publication of the defamatory material
extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving it." 4 According
to this very Court, the judicial proceeding privilege (a) does not protect publications that
go beyond those "in which the public service or the administration of justice requires
complete immunity," Allen; (b) does not protect publications made to "more persons than
necessary to resolve the dispute or further the objectives of the proposed litigation,"
Krouse; (c) does not protect publications "to more persons than the scope of the privilege
requires to effectuate its purpose," DeBry; and (d) does not protect publication to persons
"beyond those who ha[vej a legally justified reason for receiving it," Brehany.

4

Brehany dealt with a different, qualified privilege, but this Court found its reasoning
applicable to the judicial proceeding privilege.
5

Defendants' statement that the Pratts did not "seriously challenge" of the elements
of the privilege recognized in Krouse is without merit. The Pratts devoted eight pages of
argument in their Brief of Appellants to the Court of Appeals on that point. For example,
the Pratts cited Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), which held that an
attorney's publications at a press conference about a pending judicial proceeding are not
made "during the course of judicial proceedings" and are not within a judicial proceeding
privilege. The Pratts also cited two respected treatises, Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton
on Torts § 114, 820 (5th ed 1984) and Prosser, Law of Torts § 114 (4th ed. 1971) for the
generally recognized principal that an attorney's publications to the press and media are
not publications "during the course of judicial proceedings" and are not privileged.
Defendants argue the news media has "a connection to the case" in that the media
is involved in publishing stories that are newsworthy, and that Mary Ann's case was
newsworthy.

5

Defendants cite no supporting authority because there is none. The scope

of a privilege is not determined by whether a story is newsworthy.

An attorney's

statement is "privileged by the occasion on which it is spoken," and is not privileged if
made to "any person other than those to whom, or in any place other than that in which,
such publication is required or authorized by law to be made for the proper conduct of the
judicial proceedings." Buckely at 277 and/h 8. A newsworthy story does not make the
press necessary to resolve a lawsuit. A newsworthy story does not make an attorney's
active participation in spreading lies to the press privileged. The privilege does not apply
to publications made to persons, including the news media, who are not necessary to
resolve the dispute, or who lack a legal interest in the outcome of the litigation. Krouse
at f 15. No matter how newsworthy a story, the news media are not necessary to resolve

s

Defendants' argument is largely relies on "facts" that have no record support, an on
inferences construed against the Pratts, rather than for them as the standard on appeal
requires.
6

private lawsuits and have no legal interest in the outcome of private lawsuits. Defendants'
argument that their publications were privileged because they were newsworthy is not only
unsupported by any legal authority, it is directly contrary to the controlling law.
Defendants cite no evidence for their contention they decided to hold a press
conference "to minimize the potential for media representatives making inquires of Mary
Ann."

Given the posture of this case, this Court construes all facts and reasonable

inferences in favor of the Pratts. Mary Ann's Complaint was filed on August 1, 2003.
Defendants held their press conference on August 28, 2003. There is no evidence any
member of the media learned of the lawsuit during those four weeks, the most likely time
for discovering it on their own. There is no evidence any member of the public ever
obtained a copy of the Complaint other than from Defendants at the press conference. It
is reasonable to infer that but for Defendants' acts the news media would not have
discovered Mary Ann's Complaint, and that there would have been no publication of any
statement by Defendants outside of court.
Defendants' "what might have been" games is irrelevant in any event. If a man is
drawing his last breath on his deathbed, and someone walks up and puts a bullet in his
head, it is still murder. It is no defense that the man would have died anyway.
A private citizen making a privileged court document publicly available commits
a re-publication outside the judicial arena, and is outside the pale of the judicial publication
privilege. Defendants cite no evidence that the Utah Trial Lawyers Association maintains
a "brief bank," yet alone any evidence as to the contents of any document that might be
found therein. Whoever may maintain a "brief bank"for sharing its content with others
would do so outside the protection of the judicial protection privilege and publishes at his
own risk.
Defendants ask this Court to ignore its own controlling cases of Allen, Krouse,
DeBry, and Brehany and ignore the U.S. Supreme Court case of Buckley, and instead
7

apply a narrow line of Texas lower appellate court cases, whose rationale is roundly
chastised by this Court's own cases. Even the Texas appellate court Defendants rely on
is split, with an entire line of authority in full agreement with this Court's prior decisions.
See Levingston Shipbuilding Co. v. Inland West Corp., 688 S.W.2d 192, 196-97 (Tex.
App. 1985) (a defendant by filing a lawsuit, then having have his petition delivered to the
media, "stepped out of the umbrella of privilege"); Pisharodi v. Barrash, 116 S.W.3d
858, 864 (Tex. App. 2003) ("Although libelous statements made in connection to a judicial
proceeding are absolutely privileged, re-publication of such statements outside of the
judicial context waives the privilege.").

Levingston and Pisharodi both cited De

Mankowski v. Ship Channel Development Co., 300 S.W. 118, 122 (Tex. App. 1927),
which rested on language similar to Utah's "excessive publication"
The privilege accorded a litigant which exempts him from liability for
damages caused by false charges made in his pleadings, or in the court in the
course of a judicial proceeding, cannot be enlarged into a license to go about
in the community and make false and slanderous charges against his court
adversary and escape liability for damages caused by such charges on the
ground that he had made similar charges in his court pleadings.
See also Bochetto v. Gibson, 860 A.2d 67, 73 (Pa. 2004) (judicial privilege did not apply
to an attorney sending a complaint to a reporter); Ricciardi v. Weber, 795 A.2d 914, 925
(N.J. Super. 2002) (an attorney's distribution of pleadings to the press is not immunized
as part of any judicial process); White & Johnson, P.C. v. Bayne, 670 N.W.2d 430, 2003
WL 21696938 (Iowa App. 2003) ("While a defamatory pleading is privileged, that
pleading cannot be a basis for dissemination of defamatory statements to the public or third
parties not connected with the judicial proceeding."); Abbott v. United Venture Capital,
Inc., 718 F.Supp. 823, 828 (D. Nev.1988) (a lawyer's letter to the press announcing a
lawsuit, and including a copy of the Complaint, were not privileged).

8

Based on the above, neither Defendants' republication of Mary Ann's Complaint
at the press conference, nor any other statements or publications made by Defendants at
the press conference, were protected by a judicial privilege.

V.

DEFENDANTS9 PUBLICATIONS WERE NOT PROTECTED BY A
"GROUP DEFAMATION" RULE.
Defendants' contention that none of their publications referred to or concerned the

Pratts is without merit. Defendants' first act of defamation was the republication of copies
of Mary Ann's Complaint to the press conference attendees. That act was an extra-judicial
republication by Defendants to the media of the following written statements:

1.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, included in the
Complaint's definition of "Order Members," planned, assisted, encouraged,
allowed, aided and abetted in, or otherwise knew of, and in violation of a legal duty
to do so, failed to act to prevent or to report to authorities a polygamous and
incestuous marriage between Mary Ann and David Kingston.

2.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, defined as two of "Order
Members," knew David Kingston would perpetrate acts of sexual abuse against
Mary Ann and did nothing to stop it despite a legal duty.

3.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order
Members," encouraged, allowed, participated in, failed to report, or otherwise
assisted David Kingston to commit four separate acts of sexual abuse of Mary Ann.

4.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order
Members," encouraged, allowed, participated in, failed to report, or otherwise
assisted Daniel Kingston to whip Mary Ann and to beat her face and arms.

9

5.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order
Members," intended to cause Mary Ann emotional distress.

6.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order
Members," acted with the purpose of causing, or in reckless disregard of the
likelihood of causing, emotional distress to Mary Ann.

7.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order
Members," knew or should have realized they had engaged in conduct that involved
an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress to Mary Ann.

8.

Defendants published a written statement that from facts known to the Pratts, as two
of the "Order Members," they should have realized if they caused Mary Ann
emotional distress it might cause her illness or bodily harm.

9.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, as two of the "Order
Members," caused Mary Ann emotional distress resulting in illness or bodily harm.

10.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts were general partners with
Mary Ann's uncle, and that Mary Ann was forced into an illegal, incestuous,
marriage with her uncle, and that her uncle committed four separate acts of sexual
abuse of Mary Ann, all in the ordinary course of the business of the alleged
partnership, or with the Pratts' authority, knowledge, consent, or ratification as the
uncle's business partners.

11.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts were general partners with
Mary Ann's father, and that her father heat her in the ordinary course of the
business of the alleged partnership, or with the Pratts' authority, knowledge,
consent, or ratification as the father's business partners.

12.

Defendants published a written statement that David and Daniel Kingston were the
Pratt's agents, and that the acts of David and Daniel Kingston as stated above were
of the general kind and nature that the Pratts had hired, directed, encouraged,
10

consented, engaged, or ratified them to perform, and that the acts of David and
Daniel Kingston occurred within the ordinary scope and boundaries of their
employment, direction, encouragement, consent, engagement, or ratification, and
were motivated by the purpose of serving the Pratts's interests.
14.

Defendants published a written statement that the Pratts, defined as two of the
"Order Members," caused Mary Ann at least $10 million in actual damages, under
circumstances justifying a $100 million punitive damages award against the Pratts.

The "group defamation" rule does not apply where a person is identified by name,
even if he is one of others also identified by name. Mary Ann's Complaint, distributed by
Defendants at their press conference, singles out specific individual defendants including
the Pratts from a larger group of unnamed persons. A carefully compiled list that singles
out specific named individuals from a larger group does not identify some faceless
"group," it identifies the individuals. Such a publication is not a "group defamation" at
all - it is specific defamations of specific individuals, whether three or three hundred.
The Mary Ann Complaint clearly refer to and concern the Pratts as individuals. If they
did not, that Complaint would not state claims upon which relief can be granted against the
Pratts as individuals, and for that reason would be subject to dismissal under Utah R. Civ.
Proc. 12(b)(6). The statements in Mary Ann's Complaint specifically identify the Pratts
by name, and so refer to and concern them.
Defendants' verbal publications to the news media at their press conference were
made in the context of the attendees having copies of the Mary Ann Complaint in hand at
that time Defendants made their verbal publications.

See Cuthbert v. National

Organization for Women, 615 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (N.Y. A.D. 1994), in which the fact
that publications at a press conference did not identify a plaintiff by name did not preclude
his defamation suit; he only had to show that the press could ascertain his identity through
11

the records of a pending lawsuit. It is reasonable to infer that the news media understood
Defendants' verbal publications referred to and concerned the individuals identified by
name in Mary Ann's Complaint, including the Pratts.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts §564A(a) does not follow the controlling Utah
law of Lynch v. Standard Pub. Co., 170 P. 770 (Utah 1918), Fenstermaker v. Tribune
Pub. Co., 45 P. 1097 (Utah 1896) (Fenstermaker II), and Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub.
Co., 43 P. 112 (Utah Terr. 1895) (Fenstermaker I), discussed in the Brief of Appellants.
But even under the Restatement, its subpart (b) would govern this motion: "One who
publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or class of persons is subject to liability
to an individual member of it if ... the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise
to the conclusion that there is particular reference to the member." The "circumstances
of publication" are that Defendants libeled the Pratts by name, and then used the press
conference further to verbally disparage the defendants in the Mary Ann lawsuit which
included the Pratts. Defendants and their audience repeatedly referred to Mary Ann's
Complaint, making a direct connection between the extra-judicial publication of the
Complaint and the verbal statements at the press conference. Defendants' identification
of the Pratts by name in their Complaint, and their subsequent verbal references to that
document, would justify a jury in finding the exception stated in section 564A(b). 6
The policy behind the "group defamation" rule is to implement the requirement that
a person claiming defamation be able to show an injury. The policy is not, as Defendants
contend, to bar lawsuits by large numbers of defamed individuals. Such a policy would
run directly afoul of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, which provides, "All
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without
6

For the same reasons, Defendants' publication of matters constituting an invasion of
privacy also state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
12

denial ..." A court-made rule that the more people injured, the less right they have to sue,
would violate this "open courts" provision unique to Utah's Constitution. See Brady v.
Ottawav Newspapers, Inc.. 84 A.D.2d 226, 234-235, 445 N.Y.S.2d 786, (N.Y. App.
1981) and pages 31-33 of the Brief of Appellants and cases cited therein, which debunk
Defendants' argument. The Brady Court's analysis, quoted at page 32 of the Pratts' Brief
of Appellants, is sound authority for the proposition that the "open courts"provision of
Utah's constitution precludes a rule stating that Utah's courts shall be open to two people
who suffered an injury but shall be closed to the same two people if two hundred others
have also suffered the same injury.
Defendants' "what if" scenarios are readily answered. If a person merely holds up
a telephone directory and says "all lawyers are shysters," his statement is not actionable.
But if he opens the same book and, reading lawyers' names from it, falsely says, "David
Aagard assaulted me. Richard Aaron assaulted me. Charles Abbot, Douglas Adair, and
John Adams assaulted me," and continues on in that vein, identifying people by name and
saying each one assaulted him, each one so named has been defamed, not as a group but
as an individual. Each person so named has a cause of action, whether the actor calls out
three names or three hundred.
This Court's task is, not to rule on a myriad "what ifs," but to decide the case
before it.

Defendants provided the press conference attendees with the Mary Ann

Complaint, which makes specific statements about the Pratts, and then made verbal
publications in a way showing the verbal statements referred to each individual defendant
including the Pratts. This case fits within the Fenstermaker I holding that it is a question
for the jury whether Defendants' words have a personal application to the Pratts. Even the
Trial Court recognized this fact in its Ruling [R 245] when it admitted, "Our high court,
however, also stated that where the words refer only to a class of individuals, yet can be
interpreted as referring to an individual or limited individuals, that person or those persons
13

can maintain an action for liable. This would seem to indicate a factual issue, improper
for the Court to decide at this point."
Defendants' argument that the Pratts' claims were not dismissed, but were decided
on summary judgment, is frivolous. The Pratts's claims should not have been dismissed
if they could prove any set of facts in support of their claims. See Point I supra; Bergener
v. DravoCorp., 740 P.2d 818, 819 (UT 1987). The Pratts can prove that the actual facts
are as stated in their hypothetical. That proof satisfies the "of and concerning" element
required for proof of defamation claims.
In their Brief of Appellants, the Pratts described hypothetical facts that, if proven,
would negate Defendants' "group defamation" argument. Defendants complain that the
Pratts used their hypothetical to describe the actual facts of this case, in other words that
the hypothetical is the reality, and so strikes too close to home. That is a reason for giving
more credence, not less, to the hypothetical. 7
Defendants' lengthy argument about the word "particular" is perplexing.
Defendants cite no cases that even mention, yet alone apply and follow, their analysis.
The Pratts believe that is because no reported decision has trodden Defendants' twisted
7

It is now Defendants' turn to ask this Court to read the transcript of their press
conference. The Pratts do not object to the Court considering the transcript in its entirety.
Among other things, the transcript indicates William Mark may have committed perjury and
John Morris may suborned perjury, by submitting the Affidavit of William Mark to the trial
court which falsely testified as to what was said at the press conference, and in doing so
would have violated Rule 3.3 and 3.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, a matter
within this Court's purview to address sua sponte, separately and apart from this appeal.
Should this Court deign to consider the transcript on appeal as Defendants now urge,
it would in effect sua sponte be overturning the Court Appeals' denial of the Pratt's Motion
to Supplement Record. In such an event, the Pratts ask the Court also to consider pages 8
and 13-15 of their Reply Brief of Appellants to the Court of Appeals, which includes an
additional fact not then available to the trial court, that Mary Ann's attorneys have published
her Complaint on McKay, Burton & Thurman's website. As of this writing, that publication
still exists and remains a continuing defamation.
14

path of logic. The examples in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §564A itself certainly
do not, nor do any of the cases cited by any party in this appeal.
The "group defamation" rule applies only to groups, not to defamations of specific
people identified by name, however many people are so defamed. That is the lesson of
Lynch v. Standard Pub. Co., 170 P. 770, 773 (Utah 1918) where the Court states,
"[Wjhere words defamatory in their character seem to apply to a particular class of
individuals, and are not specifically defamatory of any particular member of the class, an
action can be maintained by any individual of the class who may be able to show the words
referred to himself." If as here a person cherry-picks the names of 265 specific individuals
from a group of over 1,000 unidentified souls, and compiles the names of the 265 in a
typed list, and defames the individuals named in the list, he has defamed 265 individuals,
not a group where no particular person is identified, so the "group defamation" rule,
whatever its scope, does not apply.
Defendants would have this Court adopt a recipe for abuse as the law of this state.
All a person would need to do to commit defamation with impunity is to defame the person
he wants to injure, then go on and defame a few score other innocents as well. He could
further shield himself by putting his defamation in writing and attaching it to a Complaint.
He wouldn't even have to serve the Complaint, just file it with the court clerk. After
publishing his defamation outside of court he could voluntarily dismiss his action.
This Court should exercise great restraint in adopting such a rule that flies in the
face of Article I, Section 11 of Utah's Constitution, and should await a far more
compelling case than this one, before concluding that public policy and necessity require
such a broad infringement of people's rights to be protected in their reputations.
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CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the above, Nevin Pratt and Denise Pratt respectfully ask this Court to
reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reverse the trial court's August 17, 2004
Rulings on Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum, Ruling
on Plaintiff Pratts' Motion to Strike Defendants' "Judicial Privilege" Argument, and
Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, hold that Defendants' press
conference was not protected by judicial proceeding privilege, hold the Pratts' claims are
not barred by the so-called group defamation rule, and remand this action for trial.

DATED July 11, 2006.

"y-zt-^xLeNevin and Denise Pratt

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify on July 11, 2006 copies of the above were served by first class mail to:
John Dustin Morris
McKay, Burton & Thurman, P.C.
170 South Main, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

William A. Mark
William A. Mark, P.C.
1010 North 500 East, Suite 100
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054

Douglas F. White
3282 Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, UT 84010

2273 Pratt Nevin-p 107 reply brief of appellants
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ADDENDUM A
SURVEY OF TYPICAL UTAH CASES FINDING INVITED ERROR
Assertions of Errors in Jury Panel
State v. Lee,
Defendant assented to composition of jury.
2006 UT 5, 128 P.3d 1179
State v. Winfield,
Defendant assented to composition of jury.
2006 UT 4, 128 P.3d 1171
State v. McCloud,
Defendant did not object to voir dire.
2005 UT App 466, 126 P.3d 775
Defendant consciously refrained from objecting to a
State v. Bryant,
juror.
965 P.2d 539 (UT App 1998)
Defendant knew of but failed to object to contact
State v. Day,
between
a juror and a witness.
815P.2d 1345 (UT App 1991)
Defendant refused to move for a mistrial based on a
State v. Smith,
juror
receiving a threatening phone call.
776 P.2d 929 (UT App 1989)
Defendant concealed fact that a juror had been his
State v. Curtis,
job
supervisor.
551 P.2d 1257 (UT 1976)
Assertions of Errors in Instructing Jury
State v. Malaga,
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction.
2006 UT App 103
State v. Pinder,
Defendant stipulated to a jury instruction.
2005 UT 15, 114 P.3d 551
State v. Geukgeuzian,
Defendant submitted a jury instruction.
2004 UT 16, 86 P.3d 742
Paulos v. Covenant Transport,
Plaintiff submitted jury instructions.
Inc., 86 P.3d 752
Defendant failed to submit a jury instruction
1
State v. Bradley,
requested
by
the
court.
2002 UT App 348, 57 P.3d 1139
Defendant rejected the trial court's correct
State v. Chaney,
proposed jury instruction.
1999 UT App 309, 989 P.2d
Cheves v. Williams,
Defendant did not request a jury instruction.
1999 UT 86, 993 P.2d 191
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction or
State v. Kiriluk,
1999 UT App 30, 975 P.2d 469 request a curing instruction.
State v. Anderson,
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction.
929 P.2d 1107 (UT 1996)
State v. Blubaugh,
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction.
904 P.2d 688 (UT App 1995)
State v. Stevenson,
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction.
884 P.2d 1287 (UT App 1994)
State v. Perdue,
Defendant submitted a jury instruction.
1
813P.2d 1201 (UT App 1991)
State v. Medina,
Defendant did not object to a jury instruction.
738P.2d 1021 (UT 1987)

Pettingill v. Perkins,
Defendant submitted a jury instruction.
1
272 P.2d 185 (UT 1954)
State v. Thompson,
Defendant submitted a jury instruction.
1
170 P.2d 153 (UT 1946)
Nelson v. Lott,
Defendant submitted a jury instruction.
17 P.2d 272 (UT 1932)
Assertions of Errors in Admitting Evidence
1
State v. Halls,
Defendant stipulated to a fact.
1
2006 UT App 142
Defendant offered the evidence he objected to on
Salt Lake Citv v. Williams,
12005 UT App 493, 128 P.3d 47 appeal.
Plaintiff declined court's offers to make corrections
Chang v. Soldier Summit
to an accounting.
Develop.,
2003 UT App 415, 82 P.3d 203
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.,
Plaintiff provided information to jury without
1
supporting evidence.
2003 UT 51, 82P.3d 1076
Defendant elicited the testimony he complained of
State v. Dominguez,
2003 UT App 158, 72 P.3d 127 on appeal.
Defendant did not object to admission of videotape,
State v. Bloomfield,
and examined a witness on its contents.
2003 UT App 3, 63 P.3d 110
Defendant successfully restricted evidence of nature
State v. Betha,
of prior conviction.
957 P.2d 611 (UT App 1998)
Defendant stipulated to admission of expert report
State v. Layman,
without foundational evidence.
953 P.2d 782 (UT App 1998)
Defendant moved to exclude evidence without
1
State v. Dunn,
informing
judge
of
controlling
law.
850 P.2d 1201 (UT 1993)
Defendant failed to ask court to mask inadmissible
State v. Taylor,
parts
of deposition transcript.
818 P.2d 561 (UT App 1991)
Plaintiff introduced evidence to which he
1
IStubbs v. Hemmert,
complained
of
on
appeal.
567 P.2d 168 (UT 1977)
Meier v. Christensen,
Plaintiff encouraged judge to comment on the
1389 P.2d 734 (UT 1964)
evidence during its presentation to jury.
London Guar. & Ace. Co. v.
Defendant called a witness, could not then object to
|Frazee, 185 P.2d 284 (UT 1947) witness's competency.
1 Other Assertions of Error
1 State v. Samora,
Defendant raised issue of restitution and agreed it
2002 UT 384, 59 P.3d 604
was owing.
Defendant chose not to object to prosecutor's
State v. Brown,
improper closing argument.
948 P.2d 337 (UT 1997)
Defendant made improper closing argument and
State v. Tillman,
failed to object to prosecutor's response.
750 P.2d 546 (UT 1987)
Howard v. Howard,
Motion - Plaintiff drafted findings of fact omitting a
fact, then objected to omission on appeal.
|601 P.2d 931 (UT 1979)

